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An unconditionally secure quantum cion tossing protocol
for two remote participants via entangled swapping is pre-
sented. The security of this protocol is guaranteed by the
nonlocal property of quantum entanglement and the classical
complexity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is a field which combines quan-
tum theory with information theory. The goal of this field
is to use the laws of physics to provide secure information
exchange, in contrast to classical methods based on (un-
proven) complexity assumption. Since the publication
of BB84 protocol, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2]
has developed into a well understood application of quan-
tum mechanics to cryptography. In particular, quantum
key distribution protocols became especially important
due to technological advances which allow their imple-
mentation in the laboratory [3]. Besides QKD, quan-
tum cryptography has many other applications, such as
quantum bit commitment, quantum coin tossing (QCT),
quantum secret sharing, quantum secure computation,
oblivious transfer of quantum cryptography and quan-
tum gambling [4], etc. However, Mayers [5] and Lo and
Chau [6] have shown that ideal quantum bit commitment
is insecure. Their work also raised serious doubts on the
possibility of obtaining any secure two-party protocol,
such as oblivious transfer and coin tossing.
Coin tossing is defined as a method of generating a
random bit over a communication channel between two
distant parties. The parties, traditionally named Alice
and Bob, do not trust each other, or a third party. They
create the random bit by exchanging quantum and clas-
sical information. At the end of the protocol, the gen-
erated bit is known to both of them. Coin tossing can
be done in classical cryptography either through trusted
intermediaries or by accepting some unproven computa-
tional assumptions [7]. However, it is interesting whether
quantum mechanics can provide secure coin tossing pro-
tocol without assistance of intermediaries.
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A coin tossing protocol is said to be ideal if the prob-
ability that the result accepted by both parties without
cheating is exact one, and both outcomes 0 and 1 oc-
cur with equal probability of 1/2. Lo and Chau proved
that the secure ideal coin tossing protocol is impossi-
ble [8], and it does not matter whether the protocol is
purely quantum, classical or quantum but with measure-
ments. However, the unconditionally secure protocols
of non-ideal QCT have been proposed [9,10] and it was
shown that coin tossing is strictly weaker than bit com-
mitment [11]. As denoted in [9], in the non-ideal case, it
is requested that, for b = 0, 1, the probability that Alice
gets bit b and passes the test is smaller than 1/2 what-
ever she does, and similarly for Bob. If the bound 1/2
perfectly against any of the two participants, the task
realized is called an exact coin tossing. If the bound is
actually 1/2 + ξ where the bias ξ vanishes when a secu-
rity parameter defined by the protocol increases, the task
realized is a (non-exact) coin tossing. It was found that
exact coin tossing is impossible [9].
On the other hand, the nonlocal correlation of EPR
[12] state has been applied to do much work in quantum
information field, such as quantum teleportation and en-
tanglement swapping [13], quantum dense coding [14],
QKD [2] and reducing the complexity of communication
[15], etc. However, new applications of the EPR state in
quantum information field are still to be discovered.
In this paper, we present a quantum coin tossing pro-
tocol via entanglement swapping [13] which method has
been used in QKD by Cabello [16,17]. This paper is or-
ganized as follows. In Section II, we give the framework
of our coin tossing protocol, and security of this proto-
col is analyzed in Section III. In Section IV, we consider
the practical situation and discuss the robustness of this
protocol. Section V concludes the paper.
II. COIN TOSSING PROTOCOL
At the beginning, Alice and Bob have a pairs of max-
imally entangled particles respectively. Suppose the ini-
tial state of the entangled particles is
∣∣Φ+〉
ij
=
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)ij , (1)
which is one of the four Bell states. The other three Bell
states are
1
∣∣Φ−〉
ij
=
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)ij , (2)
∣∣Ψ+〉
ij
=
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)ij ,
∣∣Ψ−〉
ij
=
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)ij .
We denote the four Bell states |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉 and
|Ψ−〉 by two classical bits as “00”, “01”, “10” and “11”
respectively. Suppose Alice has particles 1 and 2 and
Bob has particles 3 and 4. The four particles are in state
|Φ+〉
12
⊗ |Φ+〉
34
. In the next step, Alice sends particle
2 to Bob and Bob sends particle 4 to Alice. Then Alice
performs a Bell type measurement on particles 1 and 4
and Bob performs a Bell type measurement on 2 and 3,
respectively. According to the theory of entanglement
swapping [13], the measurement result will be σ |Φ+〉
14
⊗
σ |Φ+〉
23
, where σ is one of the operators of I,X, Y and
Z. I,X, Y and Z are defined as
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
(3)
The two parties will get the same completely random
result which is one of the four Bell states (respectively
denoted by “00”,“01”,“10”,“11”). If we use “0” to repre-
sent “00” or “11” and “1” to represent “01” or “10”, this
process can be regarded as a simple coin tossing process.
However, only steps mentioned above are not enough
to prevent one party from cheating. For example, sup-
pose that Alice wants the result to be “0”, she can apply
operation I or Y on the particle 4 which is sent out by
Bob, then send it back to Bob as particle 2. Otherwise,
if she wants the result to be “1”, she can apply operation
X or Z on particle 4 and send it back.
In the following we give the modification to the naive
protocol. Alice and Bob respectively have N pairs entan-
gled particles in the initial. We denote Alice’s particles by
i from 1 to 2N , and Bob’s particles by j from 1 to 2N .
Alice’s (2m− 1)th and 2mth particles are entangled in
state |Φ+〉, so are Bob’s particles. First, Alice sends her
particles which are numbered by 2m−1 (m = 1, 2, · · ·N)
to Bob with a random sequence not known by Bob. Af-
ter received all of particles sent by Alice, Bob sends his
particles numbered by 2m − 1 (m = 1, 2, · · ·N) to Al-
ice in a sequence known by Alice. After received Bob’s
particles, Alice announces the sequence of practices she
has sent to Bob. Then Alice (Bob) performs N times
Bell type measurement on the N pairs of her (his) par-
ticles, each pair including a particle of herself (himself)
numbered by 2m and a particle sent by the other party
which was numbered by 2m−1. Both the two parties add
their measurement results (e.g. |Φ+〉 , |Ψ−〉 are denoted
by “0” and |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 are denoted by “1”). If the sum
is even, the tossing result is “0”, otherwise the tossing
result is “1”. In other words, the tossing result is defined
as the total parity bit of the N Bell type measurement
results. At the end, the result can be announced to each
other participant through public communication channel.
However, only above steps are not sufficient to guaran-
tee the security of this protocol, that is, can not against
Bob’s cheating. In fact, if Bob wants the result to be “0”,
he can simply send all Alice’s particles back and casually
announce Alice a sequence of the particles he send out,
without doing anything else. If he wants the result to be
“1”, he can apply a unitary transformation (X or Z) on
any one of particles sent by Alice before sending them
back. To check whether Bob has cheated by this means,
it requires that Bob announces all his measurement re-
sults to Alice. Since that Alice sends particles in the first
order, she can not change the probability distribution of
Bob’s measurement results and needs not to announce
her measurement before she knows Bob’s results.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Now consider the security of this protocol. Assume
that an honest participant should use the value “abort”
only if he detects that the other participant has cheated
or failed to collaborate. Using the value “abort” at other
time is dishonest. It is shown that no secure coin toss-
ing protocol would exist if a protocol could be declared
insecure only because a dishonest participant can adopt
this abort strategy [9]. Therefore, we don’t consider this
case.
Before analyzing the security, we give a lemma which
will be used later. We define the parity of Bell measure-
ment result |Φ+〉 (“00”) and |Ψ−〉 (“11”) be even (“0”),
and the parity of |Φ−〉 (“01”) and |Ψ+〉 (“10”) be odd
(“1”).
Lemma. — Bell type measurement on any two parti-
cles among N pairs of particles entangled in EPR state
cannot change the total parity of the N pairs of particles.
Proof. — We number all the N pairs of particles from
1 to 2N , and the (2i− 1)th particle is entangled with the
2ith particles. It is obvious that if the measurement on
the two particles numbered (2j − 1)th and 2jth particles
does not change the total parity (where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N).
Without loss of generality, assume that the measurement
is on particle 2j − 1 and 2i (i 6= j). After the mea-
surement, the four-particle (2j − 1, 2j, 2i − 1 and 2i)
state will be changed from |Φ1〉2i−1,2i ⊗ |Φ2〉2j−1,2j to
σ |Φ1〉2j−1,2i⊗σ |Φ2〉2i−1,2j , where |Φ1〉 and |Φ2〉 are any
EPR states. Obviously, the total parity of the two new
pairs is the same of the two original pairs. Since other
particles are not changed, the total parity of the N pairs
does not change under Bell type measurement. And we
can naturally obtain the below corollary.
Corollary. — Entanglement swapping between any
2
two pairs among N pairs of EPR states cannot change
the total parity of the N EPR pairs.
We consider Alice’s strategy first. Since that she sends
particles first, no matter what type of state and what
sequence she adopts, she cannot change the probabilities
of the two outputs of Bob. Suppose the state of the par-
ticles Alice sends out is ρ1,3···,2N−1 (we have considered
the sequence in the subscript) and the state of Bob’s par-
ticles is |Φ+〉N
2j−1,2j , if Bob projects Alice’s particles and
his own particles numbered in even numbers onto Bell
basis, each projection results will be independently and
completely random. The total parity has equal proba-
bility to be “0” or “1”. Besides, Alice cannot check the
credibility of Bob’s results. So Alice needs not to cheat
by sending fake particles.
There is another question whether she can cheat after
Bob sends his particles and the information of the se-
quence of his particles. For example, she measures her
particles and the particles sent by Bob in Bell basis ac-
cording to the coin tossing rules. Suppose she wants the
result to be “0”, if she gets the result “0”, she announces
the true particles’ sequence she sent out. Otherwise,
she announces another sequence, and expects that Bob’s
measuring will bring the different result — “1”. How-
ever, from the lemma, we can deduce that this strategy
could not change Bob’s measurement result and in fact,
there is no way for Alice to change the probabilities of
Bob’s two outputs after Alice sends out her particles.
Bob has the following strategy. When he receives Al-
ice’s particles and should send back his own particles, he
can sends back Alice’s particles directly if he wants to get
the result “0” or he can send them back after applying a
X or Z type unitary transformation on any particle if he
wants the result to be “1”. It can be deduced from the
lemma that this strategy will be effective. However, since
he must announce the sequence of particles he sends out
before knowing the sequence of particles sent by Alice,
he can not definitely give the exact results of Alice’s all
Bell type measurements. What Bob can definitely give
out is only the final result — the total parity of all the
Bell type measurement results. The average probability
that Bob’s guess of Alice’s measurement results will be
pass Alice’s test is
P =
(
5
8
)N−1
, (4)
which exponentially decreases with N increasing. So the
bias vanishes exponentially in this coin tossing protocol.
The detail procedure to deduce the result of P in Eq. (4)
is shown in the Appendix.
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF THE PROTOCOL
Up to this point, we assume that the initial state of
a EPR pair is purely in |Φ+〉 and all operations are ex-
act. But in practice, the decoherence of quantum states
and errors of operations occur almost all the time. The
measurement results of the two parties will not always
be consistent since the errors were introduced. If the
probability that the inconsistent results arise exceeds the
probability in Eq. (4), the protocol becomes useless.
Suppose the probability that a single measurement will
get the correct result is Γ, it must satisfy the condition
1− ΓN ≤ P. (5)
From this equation, it can be concluded that this protocol
is very sensitive to error. For example, if P ≤ 0.01 (that
is, N ≥ 11), it requires that Γ ≥ 99.91% with N = 11.
V. CONCLUSION
In this QCT protocol, entanglement swapping is used
to establish the coincidence of the two participants. The
security is guaranteed mainly by the complexity of classi-
cal information such as the random sequence Alice uses.
In this protocol, when Alice knows the result, she cannot
change the result. If Bob tries to cheat, the probability
he passes the check is exponentially small, else he can-
not change the probabilities of the two outputs. From
the above analysis, it can be concluded that though this
protocol is not an exact coin tossing protocol, the bias
vanishes exponentially.
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APPENDIX: Deduction of Eq. (4)
Without loss of generality, we only consider the case
that Bob wants the result to be “0”, and Bob sends Al-
ice’s particles back directly after he received the particles.
Since Bob does not know the sequence of Alice’s parti-
cles he received, he can only guess a random sequence
and send it to Alice. After Alice announces the sequence
that she has sent out the particles, Bob compares this se-
quence with the sequence he has announced to Alice and
makes a set of Bell type measurement results for Alice’s
check.
Suppose that after comparing the two sequence, Bob
finds out that Alice’s N pairs of entangled particles can
be divided to m (1 ≤ m ≤ N) groups, with each group
has some (say nk, 1 ≤ k ≤ M) complete pairs and (nk)
Bell type measurements, and any group cannot be di-
vided into some subgroups with above properties.
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The number of the methods that divide N EPR pairs
into m groups is
(
N − 1
m− 1
)
. For a group has nk EPR
pairs, the nk Bell type measurements have definite parity
(it can be deduced from the lemma), so the number of all
possible measurement results is 4nk−1. Thus the number
of all possible measurement results of the N EPR pairs
is 4N−m. Now we can get the average probability that
Bob’s guess could pass Alice’s test
P =
N∑
m=1
((
N − 1
m− 1
)
1
4N−m
)
/
N∑
m=1
(
N − 1
m− 1
)
=
(
5
8
)N−1
.
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